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Imagining Justice
By Robin West
As we approach the new century and the new millennium, those of us who are legal professionals 
in liberal capitalist democracies need to drastically improve our practices of law if we are to bring 
those practices in line with our professed ideals. The commodification and marketing of legal 
services, for example, combined with a nearly blind commitment to overly combative advocacy, 
puts legal assistance beyond the means of large segments of the public, severely undercutting our 
commitment to equality before the law. A different and perhaps harder question, however, is 
whether the ideals against which we judge our practices are themselves in need of rethinking. 
What are our aspirations, for law, and for the rule of law, in a liberal society at the turn of the 
millennium? 
There are at least three salient legal arenas in which some idea of justice informs our 
understanding of the rule of law, and in all three, not only our legal practices but the dream of 
justice itself stand in need of improvement. The first concerns the vision of "legal justice" that 
informs and guides the work of courts. Judges in Western liberal rule-of-law cultures labor to 
achieve what is often called "formal" or "horizontal" justice, which means that judges must decide 
cases according to a general rule or principle, and not according 
to their personal reaction to the particular case. Judges must don the proverbial blindfold, ignore 
differentiating features, and "treat like cases alike." But why? 
Perhaps the best and most generous account of the requirement of formal justice is this: judges 
ought to strive to decide cases according to rule because by doing so they recognize, respect, and 
treat with dignity our shared humanity and our mutual inclusion in a common community. To do 
otherwise--to treat differently those who are in effect the same--would be to banish the one 
marked as different from the community. As they distill the similarities of our dilemmas and 
decide cases accordingly, judges recognize and honor that which we share, and that which binds 
us together. To the degree that the quest for legal justice is moved by that humanistic and 
communitarian impulse, it is a noble one, and something we ought to cherish. 
Nevertheless, at this point in our history the particular understanding of our universal shared 
human nature that has emerged from the judicial practice of legal justice is cramped and 
ungenerous; it needs reimagining Who is the human being whom courts protect when they decide 
cases according to a general rule of law? For the most part, our courts routinely protect what 
might be called our essential "heroic selves": our individualistic capacity for exerting our will, for 
effectuating our powers, for leaving our mark on the world, for profiting from our actions, and for 
cooperating with others, primarily so as to better compete. Hence modern courts aggressively 
protect our contracts, our will to profit, and our near absolute freedom to exploit our cocitizens. 
They will treat my decision to profit, to contract, to bargain, to leave a mark, to alter the world's 
surface, just like your decision to labor, to seek shelter, or to marry, which are in turn treated just 
like Exxon's or IBM's decision to merge, or expa nd, or move a plant. Likes, after all, must be 
treated alike--and what is alike in these cases is a willed, voluntary choice. By recognizing the 
heroic essence behind the individual choice and by honoring it, courts articulate the "human" who 
is in their view in need of and deserving of law's equal justice. The "human essence," as drawn 
and then protected by our courts' legal imagining over the past two centuries, is the human being 
_
who desires, chooses, and acts so as to profit. 
We ought to reimagine this shared essence. Courts, judges, and all the rest of us involved in the 
enterprise of law need to recognize, honor, and protect not only the heroic, individuating self 
acting in and upon the world, but also the dependent and interdependent self who is in need, and 
the self responsive to the needs of others: the infant in utter dependency; the child in need of 
nurturance; the aging, sick, and dying parent in need of compassionate care; the parent with an 
infant so in need of the support of others in part because the weakest is so dependent upon her. 
Were we to reimagine the human essence protected through legal justice as sometimes heroic but 
sometimes in need, our legal practices would change, and dramatically--we would honor, rather 
than disparage, dependency and the labor dependency exacts upon us; we would protect rather 
than dismiss or trivialize sickness, injury, and weakness; we would seek, through law, to nurture 
connections and interconnections between peoples, rather than foster relentless competition. 
Likewise, our sense of judicial virtue might change as well: we would require of judges, and of 
the legal profession quite generally, that they be compassionate as well as upright, that they be 
caring as well as possessed of integrity, that they be generous as well as consistent. We would 
hope for them, and of them, that they create not only a free world for strong and profiting 
individuals, but a caring world for interdependent communities. We would trust them to preserve 
and change our legal traditions in order to do so. 
A dream of legal justice also informs our currently recognized constellation of constitutional 
rights, no less than the day-to-day workings of our courts. Here as well, a noble and liberal ideal--
to protect the deepest and most cherished aspects of our individualistic essence against unwise or 
undue state encroachment--has been stunted by a cramped conception of the nature so protected. 
At millennium and century's end, we protect our right to think, act, contract, express ourselves, 
own property, maintain our privacy, amass wealth, and enjoy our possessions against both state 
infringement and irrational treatment. We are so protected because of a judicially conceived 
understanding of who we are: we are individuals whose essential being is best realized through 
unencumbered and counter-communitarian acts of individualistic will. 
Here again, we need to rethink this understanding of who we are, and what parts of ourselves 
should be regarded as so inviolable as to be protected by rights beyond community reach. We are 
not only beings whose essence is realized through heroic acts of independent will. We are also 
parents and grandparents and children of parents and grandparents whose essence is realized 
through acts of care that protect us in our dependency. Those caring acts not only are necessary 
for our individual and collective survival, but they also are the soil in which our moral and most 
human selves are rooted. They are also, developmentally, essential conditions for the flowering of 
the individualist spirit so celebrated by liberal jurists and protected by liberal rights. 
Perhaps we do need rights to protect our individuality. No less vitally, however, we need rights 
that we currently lack: we need rights that protect our ability and will to care for the weak among 
us and to nurture them to health, and to care for the young and to bring them up to adulthood. We 
need such rights of care not only to protect those activities against an overweening state. We need 
such rights so as to goad to action community and state support for those essential and essentially 
interdependent spheres of social life. 
Finally, a dream of justice informs our understanding of our cherished rule of law, and our 
understanding of what purpose is served by a rule of law in liberal societies. Liberal societies have 
taken to heart the lessons to be learned from states that assume too much power: overbearing 
states, like Freud's overbearing fathers, must be reined in and we freely deploy the rhetoric and 
protections of law to do so. The rule of law exists, at least in this liberal dream, to protect 
individuals from state terror. 
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However, there is another understanding of the rule of law, also central to the liberal tradition, to 
which we have not so carefully attended. The rule of law should guard us against the danger 
posed to individuals by states that either are or pretend to be emasculated: the state that, through 
neglect, complicity, or simply bad faith, allows the strong to terrorize the weak. Individuals can be 
crushed by private parties or entities no less than by states and state agents. The state that does 
nothing in the face of glaring and harmful private-sphere subordination--whether that 
subordination takes the form of violence against women within families; violence, taunting, or 
threats of violence against ethnic, sexual, or racial minorities; or violence extracted by 
exploitative work--is as much of a threat to human and community flourishing as the state that 
oppressively does too much. 
In our end-of-the-millennium liberal dreams, law respects and honors our universal humanity, 
protects our rights, and guards us against our worst political nightmares. These imaginings of 
justice are noble ideals all, and we ought to cherish them even as we acknowledge how our 
practices belie them. We also need, though, to revitalize the liberal dreams themselves. We share, 
universally, not only a will to power, but a need for nurturance, for sustenance, and for assistance: 
law in a liberal state should dignify and protect our needful no less than our willful selves. We 
seek, universally, not just to assert and express ourselves, but to connect and care for others, and 
our cherished liberal rights should at least aim to protect us when we do so. And we are in need of 
law, not just to protect ourselves against political dictators, but also to protect against the ravages 
of economic, familial, racial, and patriarchal terror. A law that aspired to protect us against private 
as well as public oppression; to crea te and guard rights of care no less than rights of 
individualism; and to recognize and dignify human need as well as human freedom would not lose 
its liberality by so doing. Indeed, law might better serve not just individuals, but communities 
were it to forthrightly strive to do so. 
Robin West is professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. She is the author of Caring 
for Justice (NYU Press) and Narrative, Authority and Law (Michigan University Press).
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